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The question of what deters crime is of both theoretical and practical interest. The
present paper focuses on what factors deter minor, non-violent crimes, i.e., dishonest
actions that violate the law. Much research has been devoted to testing the effectiveness
of legal sanctions on crime, while newer models also include social sanctions (judgment
of friends or family) and internal sanctions (feelings of guilt). Existing research suggests
that both internal sanctions and, to a lesser extent, legal sanctions deter crime, but
it is unclear whether this pattern is unique to Western countries or robust across
cultures. We administered a survey study to participants in China, Colombia, Germany,
Portugal, and USA, five countries from distinct cultural regions of the world. Participants
were asked to report the likelihood of engaging in seven dishonest and illegal actions,
and were asked to indicate the probability and severity of consequences for legal,
friend, family, and internal sanctions. Results indicated that across countries, internal
sanctions had the strongest deterrent effects on crime. The deterrent effects of legal
sanctions were weaker and varied across countries. Furthermore, the deterrent effects
of legal sanctions were strongest when internal sanctions were lax. Unexpectedly, social
sanctions were positively related to likelihood of engaging in crime. Taken together,
these results suggest that the relative strengths of legal and internal sanctions are robust
across cultures and dishonest actions.
Keywords: dishonesty, crime, cheating, cross-cultural, deterrence theory, deterrence
INTRODUCTION
The question of what deters crime is of interest to social science researchers and policy-makers
alike. Are decisions to engage in crime inﬂuenced by the threat of legal consequences? Are they
inﬂuenced by threats of judgment from friends or family? Are they inﬂuenced by the potential for
internal feelings of guilt? These questions are relevant to any society, as dishonesty can be extremely
costly. For example, it is estimated that for most countries, losses due to tax evasion are greater than
the total amount spent on healthcare (The Tax Justice Network, 2011).
In this paper, we compare the relative impacts of legal, friend, family, and internal sanctions
on minor, non-violent crimes. We refer to these transgressions as dishonest because they beneﬁt
the individual at society’s expense. We deﬁne dishonest actions as those that violate a formal or
informal social rule for personal gain; by this deﬁnition, lying, cheating, and stealing may all
be considered facets of dishonesty. It is worth noting that some dishonest actions harm other
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individuals rather than society at large; for example, lying to
one’s partner likely violates the (spoken or unspoken) relationship
contract, but does not directly harm society. Typically, dishonest
actions that harm the collective (e.g., underreporting income on
one’s taxes) are also subject to legal penalties; the present research
focuses on violations of this nature.
While much of the existing research focuses on a single
category of sanctions on crime, in the present study, we compare
the relative impacts of legal, friend, family, and internal sanctions
and consider their interactions. By drawing on a participant
sample from ﬁve countries in distinct cultural regions, we
examine whether the deterrent eﬀects of legal, social, and internal
sanctions are consistent across individuals from diﬀerent cultural
backgrounds.
What Deters Crime?
A sizeable body of research on the subject of what deters crime
has focused on the eﬀectiveness of legal sanctions. This research
stems from deterrence theory, which posits that legal sanctions
deter citizens from engaging in criminal activity. This theory,
grounded in the rational actor approach, is based on the notion
that people choose whether or not to commit a crime by weighing
the potential beneﬁts of getting away with it against the potential
consequences of getting caught (Becker, 1968). Consequences are
considered in terms of both severity of the punishment and the
probability of being caught. Building on thinking of 18th century
philosophers Beccaria (1963 [1764]) and Bentham (1988 [1789]),
and revived in the 1960s, deterrence theory has generated much
research and heated debate, with some researchers arguing that
legal sanctions have no eﬀect at all (e.g., Fattah, 1983).
Recently, Rupp (2008) conducted an impressive meta-analysis
synthesizing the ﬁndings from 700 studies testing the deterrence
hypothesis, spanning economics, sociology, psychology, and
criminology. Detailed information about each study, including
aspects of study design (cross-sectional, experimental, survey,
etc.), participant sample, categories of sanctions measured, and
information about the authors and journal were coded and
analyzed. On the whole, this meta-analysis favored rejecting
the null hypothesis that legal sanctions have no deterrent eﬀect
on crime. Furthermore, the probability of legal sanctions was
found to have a greater deterrent eﬀect than the severity of
legal sanctions. In Rupp’s analysis, there was also a clear pattern
for legal sanctions to have stronger deterrent eﬀects for minor,
non-violent crimes (including tax evasion, speeding, and fraud)
than for violent or more serious crimes (including hard drug
dealing, sexual assault, and manslaughter). This pattern suggests
a categorical diﬀerence in the factors deterring minor and more
serious crimes. In the present paper, our research scope is limited
to the factors inﬂuencing minor, non-violent crimes.
A chief criticism of deterrence theory has been its neglect of
non-economic factors that may inﬂuence crime (Meier et al.,
1984; Williams and Hawkins, 1986). Researchers from sociology
and other traditions have suggested that non-economic sanctions
have at least as much potential to impact criminal behavior
(Wrong, 1961; Grasmick and Green, 1980; Mazar et al., 2008).
One type of non-economic sanction considered is judgment by
friends and family, which some have referred to as the threat
of social embarrassment (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Cochran
et al., 1999). Research from psychology and sociology suggests
that people are highly sensitive to social evaluation (Dickerson
et al., 2008). However, according to Rupp’s meta-analysis, of the
2534 variables examined in survey studies, only 6.2% assessed
the perceived probability of punishment by friends or family,
4.1% assessed the perceived severity of punishment by friends or
family, and 2.8% assessed the perceived probability of detection
by friends, family or others. Results from the meta-analysis
indicated that the probability of punishment by friends or family
was at least as strong a deterrent as the probability of legal
punishment, and the severity of punishment by friends or family,
though less powerful than the probability eﬀects, was at least as
strong a deterrent as the severity of legal punishment.
Finally, there appears to be increasing awareness that in
addition to external sanctions, internal sanctions such as feelings
of guilt may be important deterrents of crime. Though focused
on dishonest rule violations rather than illegal actions per se,
Mazar et al. (2008) posited that dishonesty is regulated largely
by the internal desire to maintain a positive self-concept, which
is weighted against the potential material beneﬁts of breaking
the rules. In support of this theory, experiments showed that
increasing the ﬂexibility with which people can categorize their
dishonest actions (e.g., cheating for tokens with monetary value
rather than money itself) encourages dishonesty, and conversely,
that drawing attention to moral standards mitigates dishonesty.
Furthermore, several experimental studies have found that
increasing ﬁnancial incentives for behaving dishonestly has
surprisingly little impact on dishonest behavior (Wiltermuth,
2011; Gino et al., 2012; John et al., 2014; Weisel and Shalvi, 2015).
For example, John et al. (2014) found that participants were just
as likely to cheat on a trivia game when they were paid 5 cents per
self-reported correct answer as when they were paid 25 cents per
self-reported correct answer.
Considering Interactions Between
Sanctions
An additional question sometimes raised by researchers is
whether the deterrent eﬀects of legal, social, and internal
sanctions are independent of one another. Some scholars have
raised the interesting hypothesis that the deterrent eﬀects of legal
sanctions should be most evident when moral commitments (i.e.,
internal sanctions) are weak (Zimring, 1971; Silberman, 1976).
Evidence supporting this interaction hypothesis was reported
by Silberman (1976), and more recently by Wenzel (2004),
who found that in a sample of Australian citizens, penalties
for tax evasion had a deterrent eﬀect only when internal
sanctions were lax. However, Grasmick and Green (1980, 1981)
argued against this interaction hypothesis in favor of additive
eﬀects.
An Integrated Deterrence Framework
While many researchers who have explored the impacts of
social and internal sanctions on crime have contrasted their
approaches with deterrence theory, Grasmick and Bursik
(1990) proposed that the deterrence framework could be
extended to incorporate social and internal sanctions. They
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designed a survey with questions assessing the perceived
probability and severity of legal, social, and internal sanctions.
Sanction threat variables, computed as the product of
perceived probability and severity, were entered as predictors
in regression models for three illegal actions: tax evasion,
theft and drunk driving. Across the three actions, both legal
sanctions and internal sanctions were signiﬁcant deterrents,
but internal sanctions had the stronger deterrent eﬀect.
Surprisingly, the deterrent eﬀect of social sanctions was not
signiﬁcant.
Are People Deterred From Crime the
Same Way Everywhere?
The limited number of studies employing Grasmick and Bursick’s
extended deterrence framework support their original ﬁndings
that legal and internal sanctions deter crime, with internal
sanctions having the stronger deterrent eﬀect (Grasmick et al.,
1993a,b; Cochran et al., 1999; Kobayashi et al., 2001). Notably,
these studies have failed to provide evidence for a deterrent
eﬀect of social sanctions; the reason these eﬀects diﬀer from
those reported in Rupp’s meta-analysis is not entirely clear.
Moreover, these studies have been conducted on Americans,
raising the question of whether the ﬁndings are robust across
cultures. (Kobayashi and colleagues’ study is an exception,
including both Americans and Japanese, but the researchers do
not compare the strengths of deterrent eﬀects across cultures.
Wenzel (2004) also reports similar eﬀects in an Australian
sample.)
In his meta-analysis of the deterrence literature, Rupp found
that the deterrent eﬀect of legal sanctions varied according
to the country under study. For example, support for the
deterrence hypothesis was stronger in studies conducted in
Germany and the UK than in studies conducted in Canada
(Rupp, 2008). However, comparisons in Rupp’s analysis were
limited to select Western nations with suﬃcient numbers of
studies testing the eﬀects of legal deterrents. Furthermore,
the deterrence eﬀect was also found to vary according to
authors’ home country and country of publication, raising
the possibility that the cross-country variation observed was
related to author biases. Comparing culturally distinct countries
within a single study overrides these issues, and allows for
a more rigorous assessment of whether the relative eﬀects
of legal, social, and internal sanctions are consistent across
cultures.
The Present Research
Building on the extended deterrence framework of Grasmick
and Bursik (1990), we compared the deterrent eﬀects of legal,
social, and internal sanctions on minor, non-violent crimes
within a single study. To compare the relative inﬂuences of
these deterrents across cultures, we administered our study to
an international participant sample from ﬁve countries: China,
Colombia, Germany, Portugal, and USA. These countries are
based in distinct cultural regions of the world, namely Confucian
(China), Catholic Latin America (Colombia), Protestant Europe
(Germany), Catholic Europe (Portugal), and English-speaking
(USA), according to cultural mapping by Inglehart and Welzel
(2010). The countries sampled diﬀer along two broad cultural
dimensions identiﬁed by Inglehart and Baker (2000) and
Inglehart and Welzel (2010): traditional vs. secular-rational
values and survival vs. self-expression values. Within each
country, we administered a survey to two participant groups:
students at public universities, and the general public at coﬀee
shops in major cities.
We designed a survey with four sanction categories: legal,
friends, family, and internal. While the threats of judgment from
friends and family have traditionally been grouped together as
social sanctions, we considered that judgment from friends and
judgment from family might have diﬀerent motivational impacts,
which might vary across cultures. For example, the threat of
family sanctions, but not friend sanctions, may be stronger in
more traditional cultures. The ﬁrst three sanction categories
(legal, friends, and family) focus on negative consequences
that are external to the individual. The ﬁnal category focuses
on internal consequences, namely on feelings of guilt. Other
researchers used the term shame rather than guilt in referring
to internal sanctions (Grasmick et al., 1993a; Kobayashi et al.,
2001). In the psychological literature, guilt is typically construed
as feeling badly over one’s actions, while shame is typically
construed as feeling badly over who one is (Tangney, 1998).
Because guilt is triggered by violating internal moral standards,
and may or may not induce shame, our internal sanctions
measure asks about feelings of guilt rather than shame.
Participants were ﬁrst asked to report the likelihood of
engaging in seven minor, non-violent crimes, including parking
illegally, bribing a police oﬃcer, and tax evasion. For each action,
participants were asked to rate both the probability of detection
and severity of punishment across each of the four sanction
categories.
Our primary research questions were whether legal, social,
and/or internal sanctions negatively predict the likelihood of
engaging in dishonesty, and whether deterrent eﬀects are
consistent across cultures. Based on previous research suggesting
the primacy of internal inﬂuences, we hypothesized that internal
sanctions would have the strongest deterrent eﬀect across
cultures. In addition, we tested the interaction hypothesis that
the eﬀects of legal sanctions are stronger when internal sanctions
are lax.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This study was administered with approval from Duke
University’s Institutional Review Board for Non-Medical
Research. All participants provided their informed written
consent.
Participants
A total of 1,251 individuals completed the crime sanctions survey.
To ensure that our participant sample reﬂected the cultures of
our countries of interest, we limited our analyses to those who
were native residents of each country (born in and currently
residing in the country). In addition, twelve individuals were
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excluded due to technical issues or internal reasons, leaving
1,100 participants in our ﬁnal sample. Approximately half of
the participants (N = 586) were students recruited from public
universities, while the other half (N = 514) were members of
the general public, recruited in coﬀee shops from the same cities.
Participants were sampled from ﬁve countries: China, Colombia,
Germany, Portugal, and USA.
Crime Sanctions Survey
All survey materials were translated into the native language
of participants from each country, using a forward–backward
translation procedure. Participants completed the survey
individually on iPads. An instructions screen informed them
that they would be asked diﬀerent questions about the same
actions, and that they should respond as honestly as possible.
They were assured that their responses were conﬁdential and
anonymous. All participants were ﬁrst asked about the likelihood
that they would engage in seven minor, non-violent crimes, in
the form, “How likely are you to ____?” Participants responded
on continuous sliding scales ranging from 0 (“not at all likely”)
to 10 (“very likely”).
Participants indicated how likely they would be to engage in
the following actions:
(1) Omit information on your tax ﬁlings in order to pay less
income tax
(2) Speed by 15% over the speed limit while driving
(3) Run a red light when nobody is around
(4) Park your car in a no parking zone
(5) Bribe a police oﬃcer to avoid getting a speeding ticket
(6) Apply for a government tax credit knowing you are not
eligible for it
(7) Fake a signature of a doctor on a government document in
order to get an expensive medication for free.
These questions were presented on the same screen in
randomized order.
Next, participants were asked to report their perceptions of
legal, social, and internal sanctions for each of the seven actions.
Participants were asked about two categories of social sanctions,
friends and family, resulting in four sanction categories. For each
category, participants were asked about the perceived probability
of being penalized for engaging in the actions with the following
questions:
Legal probability: How likely would you be to get caught by
the government authorities or police if you. . .
Social probability (friends):How likely would your friends be
to ﬁnd out if you. . .
Social probability (family): How likely would your family be
to ﬁnd out if you. . .
Internal probability: How likely would you be to feel guilty if
you. . .
Continuous sliding scales ranged from 0 (“extremely unlikely”
to 10 “extremely likely”). Furthermore, participants were asked
to rate the expected severity of the legal, social, and internal
consequences, as follows:
Legal severity:How bad would the legal penalty be if you. . .
Social severity (friends):How badly would your friends judge
you if you. . .
Social severity (family): How badly would your family judge
you if you. . .
Internal severity: How badly would you feel if you. . .
Continuous sliding scales ranged from 0 (“not bad(ly) at all”)
to 10 (“extremely bad(ly)”).
The eight question categories were presented in random
order, with the seven individual actions presented in random
order within each block. In total, participants responded
to 56 speciﬁc questions about legal, social and internal
sanctions.
Procedure
Students at universities were recruited with ﬂyers and posters
advertising a decision-making study where they could earn
between $4 and $10. At universities, the study was run in a
testing room with 5–8 separate stations for participants. In
coﬀee shops, participants were approached individually by an
experimenter, who asked whether they would be interested in
participating in a decision-making study with the opportunity
to earn between $4 and $10. Coﬀee shop patrons who agreed to
participate completed the survey individually from where they
were seated.
Participants ﬁrst completed a behavioral task on iPads, which
involved rolling a virtual die twenty times (adapted from Jiang,
2013; see Mann et al., under review for further detail). Before
each roll, participants were instructed to select a side of the
die, either top or bottom. They were instructed to remember
their chosen side, but were not asked to report choosing top
or bottom until they had viewed the outcome of the roll (the
screen displayed the number of dots on both top and bottom
of the die). Participants were paid the equivalent of ten cents in
USD for every dot on the chosen side (the amount and currency
were adjusted for each country using the Purchasing Power Parity
Index). Therefore, if a participant mentally selected “top” before
rolling the die, and the outcome displayed one dot on the top
side and six dots on the bottom side, the participant would face
a choice as to whether to honestly report having chosen “top,” or
whether to dishonestly report having chosen “bottom”. Once the
participant indicated their choice, the earnings for that roll were
automatically added to their total earnings, displayed at the top of
the screen.With this paradigm it is impossible to know for certain
whether cheating occurred on any given roll or for any given
person. However, in large samples, if cheating did occur, choosing
the favorable earnings side (i.e., the side with more dots) on a
greater proportion of trials should be correlated with dishonesty.
When participants completed the die task, the experimenter
returned and set up the crime sanctions survey on the iPad.
This experimenter, who spoke participants’ native language, set
up the survey and instructed them to raise their hands should
they have any questions. Participants indicated their responses
to each question by moving bars along slider scales with their
ﬁngers. At the end of the survey, they raised their hand to indicate
that they had ﬁnished. The experimenter then thanked them for
participating and directed them to a payments table (for students)
or paid them directly (for general public).
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RESULTS
Correlations Between Likelihood of
Engaging in Crime (Self-Reported) and
Observed Dishonest Behavior
We ﬁrst examined whether self-reported crime was related to
dishonesty on the behavioral die task, in which participants
could earn more money by cheating. Detailed behavioral
results from the die task are reported in Mann et al. (under
review); in the present paper, we present only the correlations
between our behavioral measure of dishonesty and our self-
report data from the crime sanctions survey. Our behavioral
measure of dishonesty was the proportion of trials on the
die task in which participants reported choosing the side
of the die with favorable earnings. Overall, this proportion
ranged from 0.56 (Portugal) to 0.60 (USA) indicating a
limited but signiﬁcant level of cheating in every country. We
conducted a Pearson correlation between this outcome and
self-reported likelihood of engaging in crime, averaged across
the seven illegal actions. Across the full sample, this analysis
revealed a modest but signiﬁcant positive correlation (r = 0.08,
p = 0.012).
Examining the correlations for each country separately
revealed positive and signiﬁcant correlation coeﬃcients for
Germany (r = 0.20, p = 0.004) and the USA (r = 0.26,
p< 0.001), while the correlation coeﬃcients for China, Colombia,
and Portugal were not signiﬁcant. Further examination indicated
that these results were driven by the student samples in Germany
and the USA.
Comparing Likelihood of Engaging in
Crime Across Countries and Cohorts
The remaining analyses focus on our self-report data from the
crime sanctions survey. We next examined whether likelihood
of engaging in crime diﬀered across countries, and across
subject groups (students vs. public) within countries. Table 1
presents the results of separate 5(Country) × 2(Cohort: student
vs. public) between-subject ANOVAs conducted on each of
the seven scenarios. For every scenario, reported likelihood
of engaging in crime diﬀered between countries, and results
were signiﬁcant at a Bonferroni-corrected probability threshold
of p = 0.007. On the other hand, diﬀerences between
cohorts were signiﬁcant for only two scenarios, running a
red light and falsely applying for a government tax credit,
at a liberal threshold of p = 0.05, and for only the latter
scenario at the Bonferroni-corrected threshold. Finally, the
Country-by-Cohort interaction term was signiﬁcant for two
scenarios (speeding by 15% over the limit and running a
red light), but these did not survive the Bonferroni-corrected
signiﬁcance threshold. Based on the limited diﬀerences observed
between cohorts, along with non-signiﬁcant eﬀects for cohort
in regression analyses, we combine student and public cohorts
together in the analyses reported from here on. Figure 1
shows the reported likelihood of engaging in crime for
each scenario across the ﬁve countries, illustrating cultural
diﬀerences.
TABLE 1 | Summary of univariate ANOVAs comparing responses across
countries and cohorts regarding the likelihood of engaging in seven
dishonest actions.
Statistic Country Cohort Country∗
Cohort
Omit information on your tax
filings in order to pay less
income tax
F
η2p
19.601∗∗∗
0.068
0.013
0.000
0.655
0.002
Speed by 15% over the speed
limit while driving
F
η2p
44.898∗∗∗
0.145
0.772
0.001
2.374∗
0.009
Run a red light when nobody is
around
F
η2p
13.748∗∗∗
0.049
6.633∗
0.006
1.818∗
0.007
Park your car in a no parking
zone
F
η2p
39.500∗∗∗
0.129
0.706
0.001
0.910
0.003
Bribe a police officer to avoid
getting a speeding ticket
F
η2p
43.289∗∗∗
0.139
2.551
0.002
0.529
0.002
Apply for a government tax
credit knowing you are not
eligible for it
F
η2p
10.879∗∗∗
0.039
17.983∗∗∗
0.017
0.982
0.004
Fake a signature of a doctor on
a government document in
order to get an expensive
medication for free
F
η2p
12.130∗∗∗
0.043
3.547
0.003
0.372
0.001
All country differences were significant at a Bonferroni-corrected threshold of
p = 0.007. At this threshold, no cohort differences were significant except applying
for a tax credit knowing you are not eligible, nor were any country by cohort
interactions.
∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Deterrent Effects of Legal, Social, and
Internal Sanctions
We computed legal, friend, family, and internal sanction variables
by multiplying the probability and severity ratings for each
action in each of the four categories. Sanction threats are
commonly understood as the interaction between probability
and severity of sanctions (Rupp, 2008), which derives from
classical utility theory. We qualify this approach by noting that
although our variables are continuous, they are not interval
or ratio variables. The probability variables do not represent
absolute probability scales, but rather, participants’ perceptions
of probability. Acknowledging the limitations of multiplying
ordinal variables, for ease of interpretation and for comparison
with existing theory and research, we followed tradition in
multiplying self-reported probability and severity values to
compute the sanction threat variables (e.g., Grasmick and Bursik,
1990; Kobayashi et al., 2001; Wenzel, 2004). For the remaining
analyses, we structured our data such that each row represented a
particular subject’s response to a particular question.
We ﬁrst examined the relative importance of the four types
of sanctions across all subjects by running linear mixed eﬀects
analyses with data from all subjects and questions. These analyses
were run in R Core Team (2014), using the lme4 package (Bates
et al., 2014). P-values were computed with the Satterthwaite
approximation, using the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova et al.,
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FIGURE 1 | Self-reported likelihood of engaging in seven specific dishonest actions across countries. Error bars represent ±1 SEM.
2014). Models were estimated using a maximum likelihood (ML)
approach. To facilitate interpretation of the parameter estimates,
all ﬁxed eﬀects variables and the dependent measure were ﬁrst
standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.
Results from threemixed eﬀect models are reported inTable 2.
As a baseline, we ran an initial model with demographic variables
(gender, age, minority status, relative earnings, religiosity, and
mistrust of others) entered as ﬁxed eﬀects, and likelihood of
engaging in crime entered as the dependent measure (Model 1).
To account for non-independent responses, item, country, and
subjects nested within country were entered as random eﬀects
variables. This analysis showed signiﬁcant eﬀects for gender, age,
relative earnings, and mistrust in others. Women were less likely
to engage in crime than men, although this did not hold up in
subsequent models. Older individuals reported being less likely
to engage in crime, while those with higher relative earnings
reported being more likely to engage in crime overall. This
ﬁnding aligns with the work by Piﬀ et al. (2012), which suggests
that upper class individuals are less ethical than lower class
individuals (See also Ariely and Mann, 2013; Trautmann et al.,
2013). Finally, as others have found (Uslaner and Badescu, 2004;
Neville, 2012), mistrust in others was related to greater likelihood
of engaging in crime.
Model 2 built on Model 1 to examine the eﬀects of external
and internal sanction threats. Including legal, friends, family, and
internal sanctions as continuous ﬁxed eﬀect variables resulted in
a highly signiﬁcant model improvement over Model 1, according
to a log likelihood ratio test (χ2(4) = 2231.6, p < 0.001). As
can be seen from the table, beta values for legal and internal
sanctions were negative and highly signiﬁcant, indicating that
the greater the sanction threat, the lower an individual’s reported
likelihood of engaging in crime. Although both legal and internal
sanctions predicted unique variance in the model, it is also worth
noting that the beta value for internal sanctions (b = –0.398;
t(5488)= –27.253) was ﬁve times the magnitude of the beta value
for legal sanctions (b = –0.091, t(5599) = –6.575). In contrast,
beta values for friends and family sanctions, though modest
and only marginally signiﬁcant, were positive in sign, indicating
that greater threats of social judgment, whether from friends or
family, predicted greater likelihood of engaging in crime. We
return to this ﬁnding in the Discussion section.
Finally, Model 3 built on Model 2 by including two-way
interaction terms for the sanction threats as ﬁxed eﬀect variables
(interaction terms were computed from the standardized
sanction threat variables). Including interaction terms led to
signiﬁcant model improvement over Model 2 (χ2(6) = 106.7,
p < 0.001). We were interested in testing the interaction
hypothesis that when internal sanctions (i.e., feelings of guilt) are
weak, legal sanctions have a stronger deterrent eﬀect on crime.
In support of this hypothesis, we observed a signiﬁcant, positive
interaction between internal sanctions, and legal sanctions.
Similar ﬁndings were reported by Silberman (1976), and Wenzel
(2004). Grasmick and Green (1980) also reported results that
were similar in direction though not signiﬁcant.
To further explore this eﬀect, we conducted follow-up
moderation analyses for each of the seven crimes, using Hayes’
process model which follows Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach
(Hayes, 2013). Internal sanctions moderated the eﬀect of legal
sanctions for four of the seven crimes (speeding, running a red
light, parking illegally, and bribing an oﬃcer). For each of these
crimes, the negative eﬀect of legal sanctions was stronger when
internal sanctions were weak.
In Model 3, the eﬀect of friend sanction threats was positive
and signiﬁcant, and the eﬀect of family sanction threats positive
though not signiﬁcant. In order to gain insight into the
unexpected positive relationship between social sanction threats
and likelihood of illegal actions, we conducted an additional
linear mixed model analysis with standardized probability and
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TABLE 2 | Results from linear mixed effects models with ML estimation for likelihood of engaging in crime.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Fixed effects b p b p b p
(Intercept) 0.005 0.979 0.005 0.000∗∗∗ −0.042 0.000∗∗∗
FEMALE −0.037 0.029∗ 0.010 0.525 0.011 0.495
Age −0.084 0.000∗∗∗ −0.036 0.027∗ −0.037 0.024∗
MINORITY −0.012 0.495 −0.017 0.283 −0.020 0.223
Relative Earnings 0.057 0.001∗∗∗ 0.053 0.001∗∗∗ 0.051 0.001∗∗
Religiosity −0.006 0.728 0.018 0.285 0.017 0.311
Mistrust 0.043 0.012∗ 0.033 0.037∗ 0.031 0.057†
LEGAL −0.091 0.000∗∗∗ −0.122 0.000∗∗∗
FRIEND 0.026 0.056† 0.037 0.029∗
FAMILY 0.025 0.080† 0.017 0.437
INTERNAL −0.398 0.000∗∗∗ −0.397 0.000∗∗∗
LEGAL∗FRIENDS −0.024 0.071†
LEGAL∗FAMILY −0.021 0.108
LEGAL∗ INTERNAL 0.113 0.000∗∗∗
FRIEND∗FAMILY −0.009 0.408
FRIEND∗ INTERNAL 0.007 0.657
FAMILY∗INTERNAL 0.023 0.106
Random effects σ σ σ
Subject∗Country 0.400 0.371 0.377
Item 0.460 0.301 0.292
Country 0.143 0.126 0.133
Residual 0.776 0.709 0.700
Log-likelihood −7836 −6721 −6667
Likelihood ratio test against previous model χ2(4) =2231.6 0.000∗∗∗ χ2(6) =106.76 0.000∗∗∗
All models include subject, item, and country as random effects variables, with subject nested within country. Fixed effect variables and the outcome variable were
standardized for ease of interpretation. Model 1 includes demographic variables of interest as fixed effect terms. Model 2 additionally includes the four sanction variables,
resulting in a highly significant model improvement. Model 3 includes two-way interactions terms for the sanction variables, again resulting in highly significant model
improvement. From Models 2 and 3, both internal sanctions and legal sanctions show significant deterrent effects on crime, though the effect of internal sanctions is
approximately four times greater. Friend and family sanctions are positively related to crime (significantly so for friend sanctions). A highly significant positive interaction
between legal and internal sanctions indicates that the deterrent effect of legal sanctions is stronger when internal sanctions are low.
†p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
severity sanction variables entered as separate ﬁxed eﬀect
variables (Table 3). Demographic variables were also included
in the model, with item, country, and subjects nested within
country again entered as random eﬀects variables. This analysis
revealed that the probability variables for both friends and family
sanctions, where subjects rated how likely their friends or family
would be to ﬁnd out if they acted illegally, were signiﬁcant positive
predictors of illegal actions. The severity of family judgment was
a signiﬁcant deterrent of illegal actions, while the severity of
friends’ judgment did not signiﬁcantly predict illegal action.
Rupp’s meta-analysis and common consensus indicate that the
probability of legal sanctions has a stronger deterrent eﬀect than
the severity of legal sanctions. In contrast, in our data, sanction
severity had a stronger deterrent eﬀect than sanction probability,
for both the legal and internal sanction categories.
Do the Effects of Sanctions Vary Across
Countries?
Our next question was whether the deterrent eﬀects of legal,
friend, family, and internal sanctions were consistent or
variable across countries. Table 4 presents the results of
linear mixed models conducted separately for each country.
Standardized demographics, sanction variables, and two-
way sanction interaction terms were entered as ﬁxed eﬀect
predictors, with subject and item entered as random eﬀects.
Notably, the eﬀect of relative earnings on engaging in crime
was signiﬁcant only for China and Colombia, whereas for
the American sample, the eﬀect of relative earnings was
negative and non-signiﬁcant. Thus, when examined at the
country level, our data diverges from Piﬀ et al. (2012)
ﬁnding that upper class individuals demonstrated more
unethical behavior than lower class individuals in an American
sample.
As can be seen from the table, the deterrent eﬀect of internal
sanctions was highly signiﬁcant across all ﬁve countries. The
deterrent eﬀect of legal sanctions was signiﬁcant in China,
Germany, and USA, marginally signiﬁcant in Portugal, and not
signiﬁcant in Colombia. Finally, the positive interaction between
legal and internal sanctions was signiﬁcant in every country
except Colombia.
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TABLE 3 | Results from a linear mixed effects models (ML estimation) for
likelihood of engaging in crime, with probability and severity ratings for
legal, friend, family, and internal sanctions entered as predictors, in
addition to demographic variables.
Fixed effects b p
(Intercept) 0.006 0.962
FEMALE 0.014 0.387
Age −0.020 0.223
MINORITY −0.017 0.296
Relative Earnings 0.039 0.012∗
Religiosity 0.027 0.092†
Mistrust 0.029 0.063†
Legal (Probability) −0.038 0.002∗∗
Legal (Severity) −0.071 0.000∗∗∗
Friend (Probability) 0.091 0.000∗∗∗
Friend (Severity) 0.010 0.527
Family (Probability) 0.093 0.000∗∗∗
Family (Severity) −0.114 0.000∗∗∗
Internal (Probability) −0.123 0.000∗∗∗
Internal (Severity) −0.280 0.000∗∗∗
Random effects σ
Subject∗Country 0.372
Item 0.262
Country 0.141
Residual 0.676
Log likelihood −6474
Fixed effects variables and the outcome variable were standardized for ease of
interpretation. Subject, item, and country were as random effects variables, with
subject nested within country. For legal and internal sanctions, both probability
and severity ratings were negatively related to crime, with severity ratings having
somewhat stronger effects. For friend and family sanctions, probability of being
detected was positively related to crime; severity of judgment from family was
negatively related to crime, while severity of judgment from friends was not
significant.
†p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
To determine whether the strength of sanction threats varied
signiﬁcantly across countries, we ran a linear mixed eﬀects model
with standardized sanction variables and individual countries
entered as ﬁxed eﬀect variables, in addition to sanction threat by
country interaction terms. Country variables were coded using
eﬀect coding instead of dummy coding such that each country’s
mean could be compared against the grand mean. As is the case
for dummy coding, with eﬀect coding for k groups, only k–1
groups can be estimated according to the degrees of freedom.
In order to report parameter estimates for all ﬁve countries, we
ran the linear mixed eﬀects model twice with a diﬀerent country
excluded from estimation each time, and reported the parameters
for all ﬁve countries inTable 5. Other parameters in the model are
not aﬀected by the country that is excluded from eﬀect coding.
As can be seen from Table 5, country main eﬀects were
signiﬁcant only for Colombia and USA; overall, Colombians
reported greater-than-average likelihood of engaging in illegal
actions (b = 0.614, p < 0.001), while Americans reported less-
than-average likelihood. Sanction by country interactions terms
allowed us to address the question of whether the deterrent
eﬀects of sanctions varied according to country. Legal sanctions
were found to have stronger deterrent eﬀects for China and
weaker deterrent eﬀects in Colombia. The reverse deterrent eﬀect
of friend sanctions was particularly strong in China relative
to the other countries (positive interaction term) whereas a
negative interaction term was observed for USA. With regard to
family sanctions, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences were observed across
countries. Finally, internal sanctions had signiﬁcantly stronger
deterrent eﬀects in Germany, and marginally stronger deterrent
eﬀects in Colombia, whereas in the USA, internal sanctions were
weaker relative to other countries.
Do Deterrent Effects Vary Across
Actions?
Until this point, variation in speciﬁc crimes was treated
as a nuisance variable. To compare the deterrent eﬀects of
sanction threats across the seven actions, we conducted separate
linear regression analyses for each action. Legal, friend, family,
and internal sanctions for the speciﬁc crime were entered
as predictors, along with demographic variables (predictor
variables were unstandardized, as the standardized beta values are
computed for these models). First, the series of linear regression
analyses was run on the full sample, not distinguishing subjects
based on country. These analyses were then repeated on subjects
from each of the ﬁve countries separately.
The beta values for legal, friend, family and internal sanction
threats for each series of regression analyses are depicted in
Figure 2. As can be seen from the ﬁgure, with limited exceptions,
the deterrent eﬀects of internal sanction threats are non-
overlapping with the deterrent eﬀects of the other categories of
sanction threats.
DISCUSSION
Building on a substantial literature examining the deterrence
hypothesis, the present research compared the eﬀectiveness of
legal, social (both friend and family), and internal sanctions
on deterring minor, non-violent crimes in an international
sample spanning ﬁve countries. Replicating the ﬁndings of
others (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Grasmick et al., 1993a,b;
Cochran et al., 1999; Kobayashi et al., 2001; Wenzel, 2004), we
found internal sanctions to have the strongest deterrent eﬀect
on crime. This pattern was observed in every country studied,
indicating that the primacy of internal sanctions is robust across
cultures. In line with deterrence research, legal sanctions were
also found to have a signiﬁcant though weaker overall eﬀect. The
eﬀect of legal sanctions was signiﬁcant in China, Germany, and
USA, marginally signiﬁcant in Portugal, and non-signiﬁcant in
Colombia, suggesting variability across cultures in the extent to
which legal sanctions eﬀectively deter crime. The relative eﬀects
of internal and legal deterrents were also robust across actions,
with internal sanctions usurping legal sanctions for every action
in every country, with only one exception (bribing a police oﬃcer
by Americans).
Some researchers have proposed that the deterrent eﬀects
of legal sanctions are stronger when internal sanctions are lax,
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TABLE 4 | Results from linear mixed effects models (ML estimation) for likelihood of engaging in crime, conducted separately for each country.
China Colombia Germany Portugal USA
Fixed effects b p b p b p b p b p
(Intercept) 0.009 0.921 0.147 0.246 −0.116 0.406 −0.086 0.624 −0.254 0.151
FEMALE −0.031 0.504 −0.036 0.356 −0.010 0.745 0.023 0.515 0.071 0.025∗
Age −0.173 0.054† −0.067 0.108 −0.036 0.253 −0.072 0.053† −0.013 0.595
MINORITY −0.111 0.029∗ −0.043 0.354 −0.012 0.818 −0.053 0.212 0.023 0.273
Relative Earnings 0.192 0.000∗∗∗ 0.111 0.005∗∗ 0.033 0.234 0.042 0.241 −0.036 0.241
Religiosity −0.033 0.509 0.075 0.044∗ 0.024 0.463 0.043 0.223 −0.022 0.483
Mistrust 0.017 0.690 0.044 0.207 −0.004 0.909 0.076 0.040∗ 0.037 0.266
LEGAL −0.235 0.000∗∗∗ −0.019 0.554 −0.116 0.000∗∗∗ −0.055 0.053† −0.127 0.000∗∗∗
FRIEND 0.102 0.006∗∗ 0.027 0.422 0.025 0.527 −0.004 0.910 −0.067 0.083†
FAMILY 0.077 0.099† 0.036 0.269 −0.058 0.083† 0.067 0.050 0.033 0.275
INTERNAL −0.418 0.000∗∗∗ −0.457 0.000∗∗∗ −0.433 0.000∗∗∗ −0.373 0.000∗∗∗ −0.244 0.000∗∗∗
LEGAL∗FRIEND −0.024 0.461 −0.045 0.109 −0.011 0.720 −0.015 0.587 0.005 0.856
LEGAL∗FAMILY −0.040 0.275 0.006 0.831 −0.023 0.439 −0.028 0.278 −0.068 0.007∗∗
LEGAL∗ INTERNAL 0.179 0.000∗∗∗ 0.021 0.456 0.143 0.000∗∗∗ 0.090 0.000∗∗∗ 0.085 0.000∗∗∗
FRIEND∗FAMILY −0.002 0.940 −0.021 0.400 −0.008 0.755 0.000 0.984 0.008 0.674
FRIEND∗ INTERNAL −0.019 0.605 0.028 0.365 0.005 0.897 0.013 0.679 0.018 0.558
FAMILY∗INTERNAL −0.005 0.893 −0.014 0.656 0.085 0.006∗∗ −0.018 0.541 0.039 0.137
Random effects σ σ σ σ σ
Subject 0.175 0.404 0.283 0.335 0.358
Item 0.028 0.290 0.334 0.432 0.408
Residual 0.509 0.730 0.654 0.652 0.595
The outcome variable was standardized, and standardized demographics, legal, friend, family, and internal sanctions, and two-way sanction interaction terms were
entered as fixed effect variables. Subject and item were entered as random effect variables.
†p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
though others have argued in favor of purely additive eﬀects
(Grasmick and Green, 1980, 1981). Supporting the interaction
hypothesis, we observed a signiﬁcant positive interaction between
legal and internal sanction threats, an eﬀect also observed by
Wenzel (2004) in his study of tax evasion among Australian
citizens. In our international sample, the interaction was evident
in every country except Colombia. Follow-up moderation
analyses showed that the eﬀect of legal sanctions was signiﬁcant
only when internal sanctions were lax; however, the moderation
was signiﬁcant for only four of the seven illegal actions (in
contrast to Wenzel’s ﬁndings, the eﬀect was not signiﬁcant for tax
evasion). These results suggest that the interaction between legal
and internal sanctions may depend on the particular action.
Social Influences on Crime
An unexpected ﬁnding was the positive relationship observed
between social sanctions and crime. Overall, the eﬀect of friend
sanctions was positive and signiﬁcant. Examining countries
separately, a signiﬁcant or marginally signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
for either friend or family sanctions was observed in every
country except Colombia. To better understand these eﬀects,
we conducted additional analyses with probability and severity
sanction variables entered as separate predictors. In every
country, probability of being found out by friends was positively
related to likelihood of acting illegally; the same was true for
probability of being found out by family in every country except
Germany. Although this result was not anticipated, we speculate
that both probability of engaging in crime and probability of
being found out by friends and family may be related to a third
underlying variable, namely the extent to which the action is
normative. For example, if bribing a police oﬃcer is a widely
practiced behavior in a particular society, an individual in that
society may be more likely to practice the behavior, and her
friends may be more likely to know about it, than an individual
in a society where bribing police is not normative. In line with
the hypothesis that social norms inﬂuence dishonesty, Gino et al.
(2009) found that individuals were more likely to cheat on a test
after observing an in-group member cheat, while observing an
out-group member cheat had the opposite inﬂuence on dishonest
behavior.
Another possibility is that people who engage in crime give
more thought to the possibility of others ﬁnding out about their
actions. For example, if a person regularly parks illegally, she may
be more likely to think about (and overestimate) the possibility
of being found out by friends relative to others who have
rarely contemplated this crime. Thus, normativity and degree
of cognitive reﬂection are two potential explanations for the
observed positive relationship between probability of being found
out and probability of engaging in crime. Since we cannot test
third variable explanations with the given data, we recommend
that future research examining the relationship between social
sanctions and dishonest behavior incorporate these variables.
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TABLE 5 | Results from a linear mixed effects model (ML estimation) for
likelihood of engaging in crime, with demographics, sanction variables,
and countries included as fixed effect variables.
Fixed effects b p
(Intercept) 2.578 0.000∗∗∗
FEMALE 0.033 0.499
Age −0.120 0.016∗
MINORITY −0.047 0.339
Relative Earnings 0.153 0.002∗∗
Religiosity 0.051 0.310
Mistrust 0.106 0.029∗
LEGAL −0.329 0.000∗∗∗
FRIEND 0.082 0.048∗
FAMILY 0.073 0.105
INTERNAL −1.201 0.000∗∗∗
CHINA 0.120 0.282
COLOMBIA 0.614 0.000∗∗∗
GERMANY −0.071 0.461
PORTUGAL −0.129 0.185
USA −0.534 0.000∗∗∗
LEGAL∗CHINA −0.497 0.000∗∗∗
LEGAL∗COLOMBIA 0.299 0.000∗∗∗
LEGAL∗GERMANY 0.004 0.960
LEGAL∗ PORTUGAL 0.127 0.107
LEGAL∗USA 0.067 0.417
FRIEND∗CHINA 0.296 0.000∗∗∗
FRIEND∗COLOMBIA −0.015 0.851
FRIEND∗GERMANY −0.035 0.706
FRIEND∗PORTUGAL −0.049 0.560
FRIEND∗USA −0.198 0.012∗
FAMILY∗CHINA 0.027 0.791
FAMILY∗COLOMBIA 0.014 0.859
FAMILY∗GERMANY −0.111 0.216
FAMILY∗PORTUGAL 0.026 0.760
FAMILY∗USA 0.043 0.604
INTERNAL∗CHINA 0.083 0.414
INTERNAL∗COLOMBIA −0.153 0.055†
INTERNAL∗GERMANY −0.213 0.007∗∗
INTERNAL∗PORTUGAL −0.131 0.107
INTERNAL∗USA 0.414 0.000∗∗∗
Random effects σ
Subject 1.123
Item 0.915
Residual 2.148
Log likelihood −13158
Demographic variables, sanction variables, and the outcome variable were
standardized for ease of interpretation. Two-way interaction terms between
sanction and country variables were also included in the model. Subject and item
were entered as random effect variables. Effects coding was used for countries,
such that the reported parameter estimates compare each country’s mean against
the grand mean. The analysis was run twice with a different country excluded in the
deviation time each time, so that parameter estimates for all five countries could be
reported.
†p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
We are not aware of any other study reporting a positive
relationship between social sanction threats and likelihood of
engaging in crime. Grasmick and Scott (1982) observed deterrent
eﬀect of social sanctions on crime, while several other studies
comparing legal, social, and internal sanctions have failed to ﬁnd
deterrent eﬀects of social sanctions (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990;
Grasmick et al., 1993a; Cochran et al., 1999; Kobayashi et al.,
2001). Taken together, what can wemake of these results? Do they
imply that threat of social judgment does not impact likelihood
of engaging in crime? Such a conclusion seems highly unlikely in
light of a vast body of research illustrating the power of social
norms (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004). We propose instead that the power of social norms
occurs primarily through their internalization as moral standards
by members of society (Campbell, 1964). When individuals
identify with their society, they adopt society’s moral standards as
personal moral standards (Wenzel, 2004). The threat of personal
judgment (feelings of guilt) for one’s own transgressions then
becomes a more eﬀective deterrent than the judgment of friends
or family. In support of this theory, Wenzel (2004) found in an
Australian sample that social norms had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
tax evasion only for those who did not identify as Australian
(i.e., those who presumably did not internalize the prevailing
standards).
Some scholars have proposed that legal sanctions deter
crime not through material disincentives but by increasing
the level of social condemnation that results from a dishonest
action (Tittle and Logan, 1973; Williams and Hawkins, 1986).
According to this theory, if a person acts dishonestly, other
people will judge her more harshly for her action if it is against
the law, and it is this increased threat of social judgment
that accounts for the legal deterrent eﬀect. Interestingly, we
observed a marginally signiﬁcant negative interaction between
legal and social sanctions, implying that the legal deterrents
were more eﬀective when social sanctions were stronger. In his
study of tax evasion, Wenzel (2004) observed a similar eﬀect
(though it was only evident for those who did not identify as
Australian citizens). These results provide tentative evidence for
synergistic eﬀects when legal and social sanctions operate in
tandem.
Implications
Kobayashi et al. (2001) examined diﬀerences in workplace
compliance between Japanese and American employees, and
found that these diﬀerences could be accounted for by diﬀerences
in perceived internal, social and management (regulatory)
sanctions. In contrast, while we observed country diﬀerences in
terms of likelihood of engaging in speciﬁc crimes, these cross-
cultural diﬀerences in likelihood of engaging in crime were not
entirely accounted for by diﬀerences in sanctions. For six of
the seven actions in our study, diﬀerences in legal sanctions
across countries explained some of the variation in country-
level diﬀerences in crime, while diﬀerences in social and internal
sanctions were unrelated to country variation. These results raise
the interesting possibility that cultural drivers of dishonesty are
not entirely captured by sanctions. For example, it is possible
that cultural diﬀerences in internal or external reward associated
with dishonesty account for variation in crime. Further research
is needed to understand whether cross-cultural variation in crime
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FIGURE 2 | Summary of the beta values for legal, friends, family, and internal product variables entered as predictor variables in linear regression
analyses. For each item, sanction product variables were entered as predictors with self-reported likelihood of engaging in the action entered as the dependent
measure.
is best accounted for by diﬀerences in sanctions or diﬀerences in
other variables.
From a policy perspective, our ﬁndings raise the important
question of whether policy eﬀorts can change people’s internal
moral commitments to honesty and socially upright behavior.
In a longitudinal study on drunk driving, Grasmick et al.
(1993a) measured intentions to engage in drunk driving in
1982 and 1990, along with perceived legal, social, and internal
sanctions, among residents of Oklahoma City. This 8-year
interval was characterized by social eﬀorts aimed at reducing
drunk driving (for example,Mothers Against Drunk Driving rose
to prominence during this time), as well as harsher legal sentences
(Jacobs, 1989; Ross, 1994). The study found that intentions to
engage in drunk driving indeed diminished over the 8-year
period – but that the reduction was primarily accounted for by
the threat of internal sanctions, rather than perceived threats of
social or legal sanctions. These results suggest that over time,
eﬀorts at changing policy and/or social attitudes may translate
into internalized morals.
Limitations and Future Directions
Our study should be qualiﬁed in light of limitations. Our
data were collected using survey methodology. Directly asking
participants to assess the probability and severity of sanction
threats after reporting the perceived likelihood of engaging in
minor, non-violent crimes has the advantage of enabling direct
comparison of legal, social, and internal sanctions. However,
this methodology yields results that are correlational, and
based on self-report. It is natural to wonder whether social
desirability biases inﬂuence reports of dishonest or illegal
behavior. Although we cannot rule out this possibility, we note
that self-report methodologies are commonly used to assess
dishonesty (Grasmick et al., 1993a; DePaulo et al., 1996; Cochran
et al., 1999; Kobayashi et al., 2001; Ennis et al., 2008). We do
acknowledge the possibility that social desirability bias may vary
by country (Bernardi, 2006). However, social desirability bias
should not aﬀect our main results provided that it does not
diﬀerentially impact reports of probability or severity of legal,
social, or internal sanction threats.
Future research may provide complementary evidence by
comparing the strengths and interplay of legal, social, and
internal sanctions using experimental methods. For example,
future research might examine the hypothesis that internal
sanctions derive from social norms by manipulating whether a
particular dishonest action is condemned by in-group or out-
group members, and then measuring participants’ (a) likelihood
of engaging in the dishonest action themselves, and (b) judgment
of others who engage in the dishonest action. Furthermore,
researchers may vary the extent to which social condemnation
of an action is seen as universal or variable, and then assess
participants’ own views of the action. Finally, it would be
interesting to test the interaction between legal and internal
sanctions experimentally. For example, researchers might
examine whether manipulating the perceived probability and
severity of legal sanctions for illegal downloading diﬀerentially
impacts downloading behavior for participants with strong versus
weak personal morals against piracy.
In addition, our data highlight the need for further research
into how income and social class impact moral behavior. There
has been some discussion in the literature concerning whether
social status inﬂuences unethical behavior. This discussion
was spurred by Piﬀ and colleagues’ ﬁndings that upper class
individuals were more likely to violate the law than lower
class individuals, and that being primed with an upper class
mindset encourages greater levels of unethical behavior (Piﬀ
et al., 2012). These ﬁndings were based on data from American
samples. In the present study, we observed an overall positive
relationship between relative earnings and likelihood of engaging
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in minor, non-violent crimes. However, when examining our
data at the country level, the relationship was signiﬁcant and
positive for China and Colombia only, whereas the correlation
for Americans was negative and non-signiﬁcant. In another
study by Trautmann et al. (2013) employing a representative
sample of Dutch participants, the authors did not observe a
positive correlation between income and unethical behavior.
Trautmann et al. (2013) argued that the relationship between
class and unethical behavior is more complex than posited by
Piﬀ et al. (2012), a conclusion that appears to be supported
by our data (see also Ariely and Mann, 2013). However, we
note that both Trautmann et al. (2013) study and the present
study provide correlational evidence, whereas Piﬀ et al. (2012)
have reported causal evidence in which priming an upper-class
mindset leads to more unethical behavior. Further experimental
research employing participant samples from diﬀerent countries
is needed to better understand the interesting and potentially
complex relationship between income, class, and moral behavior.
CONCLUSION
Our ﬁndings suggest that across societies and cultures,
internalized moral standards exert the most powerful restraints
on dishonest behavior (see also Campbell, 1964). Policy eﬀorts
aimed at promoting moral internalization may be more eﬀective
than eﬀorts aimed at increasing the frequency or probability of
legal sentences. However, the process by which internalization
occurs remains poorly understood, and marks an important
direction for future research aimed at reducing crime and
enhancing social welfare.
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